In March 1693 colonial Massachusetts moved to suspend the legal proceedings that had comprised the Salem witch trials, bringing an effective end to the extraordinary wave of prosecutions that began in early 1692. The trials, which had occurred in several venues including the Court of Oyer and Terminer created in May 1692 and later the court of sessions, resulted in the execution of 20 people and the imprisonment of many others amid widespread accusations of witchcraft. By early 1693 criticism of the trials had mounted. Concerns included the reliability of spectral evidence (testimony that the accused’s spirit or shape appeared to a witness), the behavior and credibility of some accusers, and questions about the legal framework used in the prosecutions. Governor William Phips, who had authorized the special Court of Oyer and Terminer in 1692 to handle the cases, responded to growing unease and appeals for review by taking steps to halt the process. In January 1693 he dissolved the Court of Oyer and Terminer and later in March acted to suspend further witchcraft trials, directing that remaining cases be handled differently and ordering that no further arrests should be made on witchcraft charges without his approval. The suspension did not immediately free all those imprisoned; many remained jailed for months while petitions, commutations, and legal adjustments were pursued. Some defendants were released on bond; others secured liberty through separate legal channels or by being transferred to different courts where prosecutions were more restrained. The crisis continued in the public and political realm as family members, clergy, and some magistrates pressed for redress and explanation. Within a few years, Massachusetts authorities and the General Court would take additional steps — including public apologies by some figures, reversals or remittances of attainders, and later legislative compensation to victims’ families — that acknowledged the miscarriages of justice associated with the trials. Historians view the March 1693 suspension as a crucial turning point: it marked the decline of the legal machinery that had enabled rapid, often uncritical convictions and opened the way for re-evaluation of evidentiary standards and colonial governance. Debates about causes — ranging from local factionalism and property disputes to religious, social, and psychological explanations — continue in scholarship. The suspension is thus both a legal milestone in the immediate crisis and a point of departure for the long historical reckoning with what happened in Salem and surrounding communities in 1692–1693. While the suspension curtailed formal prosecutions, its human costs endured. Families sought to recover property, reputations, and livelihoods; some survivors and descendants labored for decades to clear names. The episode in 1692–1693 left a lasting imprint on legal practice in New England, contributing to greater skepticism about spectral evidence and to an awareness of the dangers when fear and imperfect legal procedures combine. No single document fully explains every decision made by colonial leaders in March 1693; the historical record comprises petitions, court orders, gubernatorial actions, and contemporary testimony. These sources collectively show a colonial government responding to mounting criticism and practical difficulties, and they locate the suspension as a pivotal moment in bringing an end to one of early America’s most infamous episodes of mass accusation.