On February 18, 1993, the Central Intelligence Agency publicly acknowledged that it had used psychological profiling methods that included information about U.S. persons. The admission came amid growing scrutiny of intelligence activities in the post-Cold War era and followed investigations and reporting that questioned the scope of domestic information the Agency had collected or analyzed. Background The CIA’s charter bars it from conducting domestic law enforcement or general domestic intelligence operations; its statutory mission focuses on foreign intelligence and clandestine activities outside the United States. Still, the Agency has long maintained an interest in foreign threats that can intersect with information about U.S. citizens—for example, Americans who travel abroad, dual nationals, or contacts of foreign targets. The early 1990s were a period of institutional re-evaluation for U.S. intelligence agencies, including debates over oversight, data collection practices, and the lines separating foreign and domestic intelligence work. The 1993 Confirmation The February 18 acknowledgment did not claim the CIA had established a wide-ranging domestic spy program, but it conceded that the Agency had undertaken psychological profiling work that at times relied on or incorporated data concerning U.S. persons. Such profiling typically involves assembling behavioral, attitudinal, and biographical information to assess motivations, vulnerabilities, and likely actions. The disclosure focused public attention on how intelligence agencies collected, categorized, and used personal information—especially when the subject was a U.S. citizen or resident. Legal and Oversight Issues The revelation intensified questions about legal authorities, internal safeguards, and oversight mechanisms. Critics and some members of Congress argued that using psychological profiling on U.S. persons risked violating constitutional protections and statutory limits on the CIA’s domestic role. Supporters within the intelligence community countered that targeted use of U.S.-person information can be necessary for understanding foreign threats with domestic connections, but emphasized the need for strict rules and coordination with agencies that have domestic jurisdiction. Aftermath and Impact The 1993 confirmation contributed to a series of reviews and calls for clearer guidelines and stronger interagency oversight. Congressional hearings and inspector-general inquiries in subsequent years examined how intelligence agencies handled information about U.S. persons, leading to reinforced procedures intended to minimize improper domestic intrusions. Public debate over the balance between national security and civil liberties continued to shape legislation and executive-branch directives throughout the 1990s and beyond. Historiographical note Accounts of the 1993 disclosure vary in emphasis. Some contemporary reports stressed the narrowness of the CIA’s activities, while civil-liberties advocates portrayed the admission as evidence of overreach. Because official descriptions were often limited and partially classified, scholars and journalists have relied on a combination of public statements, declassified documents, and eyewitness testimony to reconstruct the episode. Where details remain disputed or classified, this summary notes the limits of the public record rather than asserting unverified specifics. Significance The February 1993 confirmation stands as a notable instance in the ongoing debate over intelligence collection involving U.S. persons. It underscored the tensions between adapting intelligence practices to evolving threats and maintaining legal and constitutional protections for citizens and residents. The episode influenced later policy discussions about transparency, oversight, and the appropriate boundaries of agencies whose mandates are principally foreign-focused.