On December 20, 1998, the United States conducted a series of retaliatory strikes against targets linked to the Islamist extremist group al-Qaeda. The action followed the August 7, 1998, truck-bomb attacks that destroyed the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, killing more than 200 people and injuring thousands. U.S. officials framed the December strikes as direct retaliation and an effort to disrupt further terrorist plotting. The operation—announced publicly by the Clinton administration—used a combination of cruise missiles and carrier-based aircraft to hit sites in Sudan and Afghanistan that U.S. authorities alleged were associated with al-Qaeda and with facilities that supported terrorist activities. Among the declared targets was a pharmaceutical factory in Khartoum, Sudan (often referred to as the Al-Shifa facility), which U.S. officials asserted had ties to chemical weapons precursors and al-Qaeda operatives; U.S. officials also named training camps in Afghanistan used by bin Laden and his network. The strikes reflected a policy of limited, deniable force intended to punish and degrade terrorist capabilities without committing large ground forces. U.S. planners emphasized precision munitions and intelligence-driven targeting. Within the United States and internationally, reactions were mixed: supporters argued the strikes were a necessary response to mass-casualty terrorism and an effort to demonstrate U.S. resolve; critics contended the evidence linking some targets to al-Qaeda or weapons programs was inconclusive and warned of civilian casualties and diplomatic fallout. The choice to strike in Sudan was particularly controversial. The Al-Shifa facility had been a major pharmaceutical producer for Sudan and parts of neighboring countries; its destruction raised immediate humanitarian and legal concerns. Subsequent investigations and scholarship have disputed aspects of the U.S. case against the factory, and debate continues among historians, journalists and former officials about how solid the intelligence was that tied the facility to al-Qaeda or chemical weaponization efforts. The strikes also underscored the challenges of counterterrorism policy in the late 1990s: al-Qaeda operated transnationally from bases in Afghanistan and networks across the Middle East and Africa, complicating attribution and the selection of proportionate responses. The 1998 strikes did not eliminate al-Qaeda’s leadership or core capabilities; Osama bin Laden and senior lieutenants survived and al-Qaeda continued to plan and carry out attacks in the following years. Legally and diplomatically, the strikes prompted discussion about the limits of unilateral military action against non-state actors and actions on the territory of sovereign states. In U.S. domestic politics the strikes were debated across party lines, with questions raised about intelligence quality, collateral damage, and the long-term strategy for combating global terrorism. In the broader historical view, the December 1998 strikes are seen as an early example of the use of precision air power and limited standoff strikes against terrorist networks—an approach that would be refined and expanded in subsequent decades. While intended to deter additional attacks and disrupt al-Qaeda’s infrastructure, the strikes illustrated the difficulties of translating limited military actions into durable strategic gains against diffuse, ideologically driven networks.