On August 20, 1998, the United States conducted retaliatory missile strikes using Tomahawk cruise missiles against targets in Afghanistan and Sudan in response to the August 7, 1998, bombings of U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. The embassy bombings killed over 200 people and injured thousands; U.S. investigations at the time attributed responsibility to al-Qaeda and associated operatives, prompting a decision for direct military retaliation. Targets and execution The strikes in Afghanistan focused on suspected al-Qaeda training camps and compounds in the eastern part of the country, then under limited central government control and hosting foreign militant groups. In Sudan, the operation targeted the Al-Shifa pharmaceutical factory in Khartoum, which U.S. officials said was linked to chemical weapons precursors and al-Qaeda—an assertion later disputed and remains contested. The U.S. used surface warships in the Arabian Sea to launch dozens of Tomahawk cruise missiles against the designated sites. Immediate U.S. rationale Senior U.S. officials described the strikes as limited, proportionate reprisals intended to disrupt terrorist infrastructure, degrade operational capabilities, and signal that attacks on American citizens and facilities would be met with force. The operation was also framed as part of a broader effort to pressure states and groups that harbored or supported international terrorist networks. Contested evidence and international reactions The attribution of the embassy bombings to al-Qaeda was supported by U.S. intelligence assessments and later reinforced by criminal indictments and prosecutions of individuals linked to the network. However, some claims made by U.S. officials about the Sudan target—particularly the alleged link between the Al-Shifa factory and chemical weaponization or al-Qaeda—were challenged by independent investigators, humanitarians, and Sudanese authorities. Critics argued the evidence was insufficient and that the factory produced medicines and civilian goods; years later, debates over the accuracy of those assessments persisted in scholarly and policy literature. Diplomatic and legal context At the time, the United States justified the strikes as self-defense and as part of counterterrorism operations. International responses were mixed: some governments expressed support for action against terrorism, while others criticized strikes conducted without explicit United Nations authorization or expressed concern about civilian harm and the robustness of the evidence against certain targets. Aftermath and significance The August 1998 missile strikes marked one of the first prominent uses of long-range precision cruise missiles in the U.S. campaign against transnational terrorism and demonstrated Washington’s willingness to use stand-off conventional force in response to non-state attacks. The strikes did not eliminate al-Qaeda’s leadership or operational capacity; the group continued to plan and execute further attacks. The disputed aspects of the Sudan strike, particularly the fate of the Al-Shifa facility, fed into ongoing debates about intelligence quality, accountability, and the risks of military action based on contested evidence. Lessons drawn from the operation influenced later U.S. counterterrorism policy, including the emphasis on improved intelligence vetting and greater scrutiny of collateral impacts before kinetic actions. Historical note This summary reflects publicly available accounts and declassified materials up to the mid-2020s. Some details—especially concerning intelligence assessments and internal deliberations—remain subject to revision as additional documents are released or further research is published.