On September 24, 2014, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a ruling concerning state restrictions on abortion clinics that clarified how courts should assess laws regulating abortion providers. The decision came amid a wave of state-level regulations—often called Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers (TRAP) laws—that had been passed in many states in the years following the Court’s 1973 Roe v. Wade framework and the 1992 Planned Parenthood v. Casey standard. Background In the years before the 2014 decision, several states enacted requirements for abortion clinics and providers that included ambulatory surgical-center standards, admitting-privileges requirements for physicians, and other structural or licensing conditions. Supporters said these measures protected patient safety; opponents and many reproductive-rights groups argued they were designed to reduce access to abortion by imposing costly and medically unnecessary burdens on providers. Legal context The controlling standard for evaluating abortion restrictions since Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992) asks whether a law has the purpose or effect of placing an undue burden on a woman’s ability to obtain an abortion before fetal viability. Lower federal courts and state courts had been split on how to apply that standard to clinic regulations—some upholding laws as legitimate health regulations, others finding they produced undue burdens because they led to clinic closures and longer travel distances for patients. The Court’s ruling In the 2014 decision, the Supreme Court addressed how to evaluate whether such regulations create an undue burden. The Court rejected a legal approach that would have given states broad deference to justify restrictions solely by citing general health and safety goals without a concrete showing that the regulations actually benefited patients in practice. Instead, the Court emphasized that courts must look to the real-world effects of a law, including evidence about whether it imposes substantial obstacles to access. Implications The ruling made clear that courts should not accept state-supplied justifications at face value when those justifications are speculative or unsupported by evidence. For clinics and providers, the decision meant that facially neutral regulations could be struck down if plaintiffs showed they produced significant clinic closures, substantially increased distances or wait times, or otherwise had the effect of restricting access. For states, the decision signaled that regulatory measures would need stronger empirical support tying them to actual medical benefits if they were to survive constitutional scrutiny. Aftermath and significance The opinion shaped subsequent litigation over clinic regulations by clarifying evidentiary expectations and reinforcing the undue-burden framework as a central constitutional test. It did not eliminate state authority to regulate medical standards; rather, it required that such exercises of authority be backed by demonstrable benefits and that courts weigh those benefits against burdens on access. Notes on scope and sources This summary describes the Court’s approach as articulated in the September 24, 2014 decision and its context in case law dating back to Roe v. Wade (1973) and Planned Parenthood v. Casey (1992). Specific outcomes in particular states continued to depend on factual records developed in lower courts and subsequent Supreme Court decisions interpreting the undue-burden standard.