On June 13, 1966, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a landmark decision in Miranda v. Arizona that transformed police interrogation practices across the United States. The Court held that statements obtained during custodial interrogation are inadmissible at trial unless certain procedural safeguards are observed. Chief among these safeguards is the requirement that law enforcement inform suspects of their right to remain silent and their right to an attorney. If those warnings—now commonly called "Miranda warnings"—are not given, and if the suspect's statements were the product of custodial interrogation, the prosecution generally may not use the statements in its case-in-chief. Background The Miranda decision consolidated several cases in which suspects had confessed after police questioning without being informed of procedural protections. The Court emphasized that custodial interrogation poses a risk of compulsion and that the Fifth Amendment’s protection against compelled self-incrimination must be safeguarded. The opinion, written by Chief Justice Earl Warren, framed the warnings as measures necessary to ensure that any waiver of rights is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. Legal holdings and practical requirements Miranda established multiple requirements for admissibility of statements made during custodial interrogation: - Police must provide clear warnings that the suspect has the right to remain silent, that anything said may be used against the suspect in court, that the suspect has the right to consult with an attorney and have one present during questioning, and that an attorney will be appointed if the suspect cannot afford one. - If the suspect invokes the right to remain silent, questioning must cease. - If the suspect requests an attorney, interrogation must stop until counsel is present. - A suspect’s waiver of rights must be voluntary, knowing, and intelligent; courts assess the totality of circumstances to determine validity. Scope, limitations, and subsequent developments Miranda applies specifically to custodial interrogations—situations in which a reasonable person would not feel free to leave. The decision does not bar all admissions obtained by police; rather, it bars the use at trial of statements obtained in violation of the decision’s procedural safeguards. Over time, the Court has refined Miranda’s application. For example, the Court has clarified what constitutes custody, how waivers are evaluated, and exceptions such as the public-safety exception, under which courts have allowed certain unwarned statements when immediate danger justified officers’ questions. Impact and significance Miranda reshaped policing by requiring officers to incorporate warnings into standard practice, thereby changing how evidence is gathered and how investigators conduct interviews. The decision sparked debate and criticism from some who argued it would impede law enforcement, and from others who sought greater protections for suspects. Empirically, Miranda has affected criminal procedure training, police manuals, and judicial review of confessions. Continuing debates Though Miranda remains a foundational precedent, its scope and practical effects are still litigated in courts. Questions about the adequacy of warnings, what constitutes a valid waiver, and how exceptions should apply continue to arise. The decision remains central to discussions of constitutional protections during police encounters and to broader debates about the balance between law enforcement interests and individual rights. Historical note Miranda v. Arizona is widely cited as one of the most consequential criminal procedure rulings of the Warren Court era. Its June 13, 1966 decision established procedures that remain a routine part of American policing and courtroom practice, while also prompting ongoing legal and policy discussion about the protection of suspects’ constitutional rights.